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Take the Fifth . . . Please!: The Original Insignificance 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause 
Gary Lawson∗ 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause adds nothing to 
the Constitution’s original meaning. Every principle for limiting federal 
executive, judicial, and even legislative powers that can plausibly be 
attributed to the idea of “due process of law”—from the principle of 
legality forbidding executive or judicial action in the absence of law, to 
the requirement of notice before valid judicial judgments, to the 
limitation on arbitrary governmental action that today goes under the 
heading of “substantive due process”—is already contained in the text 
and structure of the Constitution of 1788. The Fifth Amendment Due 
Process of Law Clause confirms those principles but does not create them. 
Accordingly, originalist attention should be focused on the 1788 
Constitution itself, not on the “exclamation point” added to it in 1791. 
This Article defends those claims and briefly explores why and how 
modern doctrine has moved from this substantively oriented account of 
limitations on governmental powers to a focus on executive and judicial 
procedures. That shift in focus from substance to process may result in 
some measure from doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process of Law Clause. The limitations on federal power built into the 
Constitution of 1788 obviously do not apply to state governments, so 
attributing the Fifth Amendment’s meaning to the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes little sense (though if that is really what the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, that is just life). A 
proceduralist account of due process of law makes some sense under the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, but it is a large mistake to read that 
proceduralist account back into the Fifth Amendment. 
The bottom lines are that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause (1) is much more about substance than about procedure and (2) 
is basically irrelevant to the Constitution’s original meaning. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Due Process of Law Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments appear to pose some vexing interpretative problems for 
constitutional originalists.1 Initially, there is the question whether the 
two clauses, enacted seventy-seven years apart, have the same meaning 
or whether each provision calls for a distinct interpretative exercise.2 
 
 1.  They may well pose vexing interpretative problems for non-originalists as well, 
depending on the content of the non-originalist theory, but those problems are not my 
concern here. 
 2.  Compare Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 408 (2010) (suggesting that substantive due process might be a plausible 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment but is not a plausible interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment), with Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1777–78 (2012) (“There is nothing in the legislative or ratification 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to suggest that it was understood to operate against states 
any differently than due process clauses had since the early days of the Republic.”). The Supreme 
Court once intimated that there might be differences in the meanings of the two provisions, see 
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328 (1901) (“While the language of those 
amendments is the same, yet as they were engrafted upon the Constitution at different times 
and in widely different circumstances of our national life, it may be that questions may arise in 
which different constructions and applications of their provisions may be proper.”), but 
immediately backed off from any implications of that suggestion. See id. at 329 (“[W]e . . . shall 
proceed, in the present case, on the assumption that the legal import of the phrase ‘due process 
of law’ is the same in both Amendments. Certainly, it cannot be supposed that, by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it was intended to impose on the States, when exercising their powers 
of taxation, any more rigid or stricter curb than that imposed on the Federal government, in a 
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Focusing solely for the moment on the text of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process of Law Clause, which says that no person shall “be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”3 one 
immediately encounters tricky questions about the meaning of the 
phrase “life, liberty, or property.” Does the word “life” bear the 
relatively expansive meaning given by William Blackstone of “a 
person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his 
body, his health, and his reputation,”4 or does it implicate only capital 
punishment or other existence-ending governmental actions? Does 
“liberty” mean anything more than freedom of locomotion5 and, if 
so, how much more? Does “property” refer to land, land plus chattels, 
all interests recognized as property by general common law in 1791, 
or interests that can include expectations of future government 
benefits?6 There are also questions about the meaning of the phrase 
“without due process of law.” Does “without due process of law” 
invoke only long-established prohibitions on rights-affecting 
executive or judicial action undertaken without legal authority7 or 
proper form?8 Or does it mean whatever procedures are fair under all 
of the facts and circumstances of a particular case,9 or the product of 
 
similar exercise of power, by the Fifth Amendment.”). In order to address this question 
adequately, one would need to determine, inter alia, whether amendments to the Constitution 
should be understood in light of the same interpretative norms and baselines that guide 
interpretation of the original Constitution, which is emphatically a topic for another day. 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. 
 5.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–33 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (finding that a historic reading makes it “hard to see how the ‘liberty’ protected by 
the [Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause could be interpreted to include anything broader 
than freedom from physical restraint”). 
 6.  See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 557–77 (1972) (explaining, 
in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, that constitutional “property” interests can 
include expectations of receipt of future benefits in some cases). 
 7.  See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
276 (1856); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 841–42 (7th ed. 2016). 
 8.  See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process 
of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975). 
 9.  See Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: 
Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1, 7–15 (2005) (describing, without endorsing, this case-law interpretation of due process 
of law). 
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some kind of narrow, utilitarian calculus,10 or something more 
substantive that serves as a font of protection against even prospective 
legislation?11 One might also wonder what it means to be “deprived” 
of life, liberty, or property. Does this term connote some kind of 
intentionality, or will mere negligence suffice for a deprivation?12 
Finally, one might ask who or what counts as a “person” protected by 
the clause. Does that term extend to juridical persons such as 
corporations, to human beings who are not yet born, or both?13 
These questions are vitally important for anyone interested in real-
world doctrine. They might well be important for understanding the 
original interpretative meaning14 of the Due Process of Law Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. But to ask those questions in the context 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause is fruitless 
for  the simple reason that the clause itself is irrelevant to 
the  Constitution’s original interpretative meaning.15 The Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause adds virtually nothing to, 
 
 10.  See id. at 15–23 (describing, without endorsing, this case-law interpretation of due 
process of law). 
 11.  For a compendium of the various possible meanings of “substantive” due process, 
see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 
493 (1997). 
 12.  The Supreme Court, after vacillating for a few years, settled on requiring 
intentionality, or at least recklessness, for a constitutional deprivation. See Daniels v. Williams, 
474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 13.  On the assumption that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have the same 
meaning in this regard, current law says “yes” with respect to corporations, see Santa Clara Cty. 
v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), and “not really” with respect to the unborn, see Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). This Article takes no position on either conclusion. For a 
thoughtful article exploring the latter issue, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of 
Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2013). 
 14.  By “interpretative” meaning I mean the communicative content of the words used 
in the text. Legal actors often employ the word “meaning” in very different senses to describe, 
for example, the effect that those words are or should be given in adjudicative actions, which 
may be only contingently, if at all, related to the words’ communicative meaning. On the 
difference between interpretative, or communicative, meaning and adjudicative, or normative, 
meaning, see Gary Lawson, Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 2143, 2155–58 (2017). 
 15.  Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 99 
(describing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause as irrelevant and trivial, but for 
somewhat different reasons than are outlined here). The adjective “original” in the context of 
interpretative, or communicative, meaning is redundant, and I will henceforth ordinarily omit it 
unless it is necessary for clarity. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: Could 
Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460–62 (2016). 
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and subtracts nothing from, the meaning of the Constitution of 1788. 
As with most provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is an “exclamation 
point”16 that highlights certain legal norms but does not create or 
change them. 
This claim should not be at all startling. The Federalists in 1787 
consistently maintained that a bill of rights more extensive than the 
one found in Article I, Section 9 of the original constitutional text was 
unnecessary and would only give rise to false implications about the 
scope of national power because the Constitution of 1788 gave 
institutions of the national government no power to violate the various 
rights specified in the amendments.17 To them, the Bill of Rights was 
redundant with limitations on national powers already found in the 
text and structure of the Constitution. To be sure, a great 
many Antifederalists strongly disagreed, and ultimately disagreed 
successfully, about the need for a more robust bill of rights, but their 
insistence on the importance of an additional bill of rights was based 
largely on an exaggerated view of the powers of Congress, especially 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, that does not withstand 
close  scrutiny.18 The Antifederalists were right about a great many 
things,  quite possibly including the wisdom of having a national 
government  in the first place, but the Federalists were right about this 
interpretative point.19 
While there are certain features of the enacted 1791 Bill of Rights 
that arguably refine or clarify the pre-existing legal order to some 
degree20 or extend some 1788 prohibitions on national power to the 
 
 16.  See Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 
511 (1999). 
 17.  See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: 
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 
635–36 (2009); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional 
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 477–79 (2008). 
 18.  See GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
(2010) (describing various strands of thought on the Necessary and Proper Clause, all of which 
converge on the idea that the clause is a limited rather than unlimited grant of power). 
 19.  See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 534–35 (1871) (vindicating the Federalists’ 
fears about false implications of federal power that might be drawn from a bill of rights). 
 20.  The Sixth and Seventh Amendments arguably add a measure of specificity to pre-
existing norms regarding jury trials. See Lawson, supra note 17, at 489–90. The first two 
amendments in the Bill of Rights proposed by the first Congress, neither of which secured the 
necessary votes for ratification in 1791, would have made substantive changes to the 
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governance of federal territories,21 the ratification of the Bill of Rights 
made very few alterations to the legal landscape. Outside of federally 
governed territory or the District of Columbia,22 virtually nothing 
that  was constitutional on December 14, 1791, suddenly became 
unconstitutional on December 15, 1791. This is particularly true with 
respect to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. That 
clause simply reflects ideas that were already fully incorporated into 
the constitutional text of 1788. 
A principal vehicle for incorporating those ideas of due process of 
law into the constitutional text is the scheme of separation of powers. 
Nathan Chapman and Mike McConnell have recently argued that the 
ideas of separation of powers and due process of law grew together, so 
that the original-meaning content of “due process of law” is driven in 
considerable measure, if not wholly, by principles of separation of 
powers.23 That is partly but not entirely right. The ideas most centrally 
identified with due process of law are indeed separation-of-powers 
ideas, which is a principal reason why the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process of Law Clause is redundant. The proper conclusion, however, 
is not that one therefore should interpret the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process of Law Clause in light of separation of powers principles, but 
 
Constitution. The original proposed second amendment, postponing the effectiveness of any 
congressional pay raise until after the next election, failed to secure enough votes for ratification 
in 1791 but was ratified as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1992. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, 
shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.”). The original 
proposed first amendment contained a complicated formula for altering the size of congressional 
districts; it failed to pass by one vote. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 14–17 (1998). 
 21.  The enacted First Amendment (the original proposed third amendment), for 
example, prevents Congress from passing laws respecting establishments of religion in federally 
governed territory. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Prior to December 15, 1791, Congress could 
presumably have used its powers under the Territories Clause or the District Clause, which are 
the powers of a general rather than limited government, to establish religion in federal territory. 
That power vanished when the First Amendment became law. 
 22.  Concededly, this is a rather large area. At the time of the founding, about forty 
percent of the country was federally owned territory. Much of that territory, however, was 
sparsely populated, so the raw geographical numbers are somewhat misleading. 
 23.  See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 272 
(1985) (“[C]onsiderable historical evidence supports the position that ‘due process of law’ was 
a separation-of-powers concept designed as a safeguard against unlicensed executive action, 
forbidding only deprivations not authorized by legislation or common law.”). 
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that one should not interpret the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of 
Law Clause at all.24 Originalists are well advised to spend their time 
and energy examining the Constitution of 1788 rather than the 
exclamation point added to it in 1791. 
Once one focuses on the Constitution of 1788 as the proper 
object of interpretation, some perhaps surprising results emerge. In 
particular, the ideas that today fall under the heading of “substantive 
due process” acquire a new significance for originalists, albeit in a 
different form and from a different source than modern proponents 
of that doctrine invoke. For those who are tempted to see a term such 
as “substantive due process” as an oxymoron,25 one must not let 
familiar labels drive judgment. As Timothy Sandefur has rightly 
emphasized, the clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are 
not really “due process” clauses, and it is potentially seriously 
misleading to refer to them as such. They are “due process of law” 
clauses.26 As an original matter, as we will see, due process of law is 
often about substance far more than it is about procedure. The same 
is accordingly true of the principles of lawful executive and judicial 
(and perhaps legislative) action incorporated into the original 
Constitution that are repeated and reflected in the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process of Law Clause. 
Parts II through IV of this Article show how the text and structure 
of the Constitution of 1788 lay out norms of legality, notice, and the 
forms of executive and judicial action that were emphasized and 
reaffirmed in, but not constitutionally created by, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. Part V briefly explores 
whether the original Constitution contains norms of substantive 
rationality, akin to “substantive due process,” that place limits on 
Congress. The answer, perhaps surprisingly from an originalist 
perspective, is yes because of basic principles of fiduciary law that serve 
 
 24.  The familiar interpretative canon that warns against construing language to be useless 
has much less application across provisions in the Constitution than it does across terms within 
a specific provision. The Constitution contains a significant number of clauses that are 
substantively redundant, no doubt as a precaution against making faulty inferences or 
assumptions. See Lawson, supra note 17, at 485–89. 
 25.  See Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
253 (2016) (collecting references). 
 26.  See, e.g, Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of 
Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 286 (2012). 
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as background interpretative norms for the Constitution. If the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause is properly construed to 
impose substantive restraints on legislation—and this Article is 
officially agnostic on (if unofficially skeptical about) that precise 
interpretative point—any such restraints merely replicate and 
emphasize limits that are already built into the original Constitution. 
Part VI of this Article, with considerable trepidation, comments 
on the quite different significance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process of Law Clause, which is possibly far more powerful than 
legal doctrine has ever recognized. The Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process of Law Clause may be constitutionally insignificant for 
originalists, but the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause is most decidedly significant, both doctrinally and as a matter 
of original meaning, though figuring out the exact original meaning 
is a tough nut that I leave largely to others to crack. While it is not my 
mission to present an authoritative account of the original meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, or anything 
else having to do with the Fourteenth Amendment, I offer what I 
hope is a fresh look at some of the key cases in the half-century 
following the Civil War in order to help explain why modern due 
process doctrine, which focuses on executive and judicial hearings, 
looks so very different from an eighteenth-century conception of due 
process of law, which looks to executive and judicial (and possibly 
legislative) lawfulness. 
My goal throughout this Article is descriptive, not normative. I 
aim to uncover the original meaning—or, rather, non-meaning—of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, to provide a 
framework for exploring the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, and to suggest how and 
why legal doctrine has buried the former. These last two tasks are 
approached gingerly and tentatively; it would require a lengthy book 
to sort through them properly. In particular, when it comes to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, I seek more to suggest lines for future 
inquiry than to provide clear answers. 
II. THE LAW OF THE LAND AS THE LAW OF LEGALITY 
What would be the significance or meaning of “due process of 
law” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries? For that, 
we must start in the thirteenth century. More precisely, we must start 
2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  2:26 PM 
611 Take the Fifth . . . Please! 
 619 
with what eighteenth century thinkers and leaders thought about what 
seventeenth century thinkers and leaders thought about thirteenth 
century writings.27 
Article 39 of the 1215 Magna Carta famously provided that “[n]o 
free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or 
exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except 
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”28 The 
reissuance of the Great Charter in 1225 similarly provided:  
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his 
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, 
or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor 
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law 
of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any 
man either Justice or Right.29  
The “we” promising not to do any of these things was a very royal 
“we”—namely, the King. This Article of Magna Carta is a disavowal 
of royal, or executive, authority; “here the King acknowledged that 
his mere dictates are not the law.”30 To be sure, one must be careful 
not to read modern notions of separated governmental powers, 
including categories such as “executive” and “judicial,” into a 
thirteenth-century instrument. The thirteenth century did not sharply 
differentiate executive from judicial power. Even seventeenth-century 
 
 27.  Even more precisely, we need to know what eighteenth century thinkers and leaders 
thought about what seventeenth century thinkers and leaders thought about what thirteenth 
century thinkers and leaders thought about eleventh century writings. The words of Magna 
Carta that gave rise to the idea of due process of law did not spring full blown from the minds 
of thirteenth-century English barons (or perhaps from the mind of a thirteenth-century English 
king, if Article 39 of Magna Carta was really a pro-royalist provision, see J.C. HOLT, MAGNA 
CARTA 328–30 (2d ed. 1992)). Those words had antecedents in the law of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the eleventh century. See RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1–2 (1926). 
 28.  HOLT, supra note 27, at 461. 
 29.  9 Hen. III, ch. 29 (1225). For those who do not trust translators, the original Latin 
version of the text is: 
 Nullus liber homo decetero capiatur vael imprisonetur aut disseisiatur de aliquo libero 
tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur 
aut aliquo alio modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi 
per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terre. 
1215: Magna Carta (Latin and English), ONLINE LIBR. LIBERTY, http://oll.liberty
fund.org/pages/1215-magna-carta-latin-and-engish (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). 
 30.  Timothy Sandefur, Lex Terrae 800 Years On: The Magna Carta’s Legacy Today, 9 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 759, 760 (2015). 
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thinkers like John Locke thought of judicial power as an aspect of 
executive power.31 Furthermore, a distinction between executive and 
legislative power was, at best, hazy at the time of Magna Carta.32 Still, 
the object of the provision was to place limitations on the power of 
the King. That is a big deal. 
The interests protected by this provision were interests of property 
and natural liberty. The historical contours of these interests in the 
thirteenth century are not relevant to my inquiry. What matters is how 
an eighteenth-century author would use those terms, and that 
depends more on the seventeenth century than on the thirteenth. Sir 
Edward Coke defined the terms in this Article of Magna Carta in 
expansive fashion, perhaps more expansively than they were intended 
to be read in 1215 or 1225. While “disseisin” literally refers only to 
loss of real property, Lord Coke wrote that the term intended “that 
lands, tenements, goods, and chattells shall not be seised into the 
Kings hands, contrary to this great Charter, and the Law of the 
Land.”33 Being “ruined” or “destroyed,” said Coke, includes being 
put to death.34 Thus, the interests identified in this provision of Magna 
Carta, as understood by Coke, are very well encapsulated by the 
phrase “life, liberty, or property.” And Coke’s understanding is the 
most important element for grasping the likely eighteenth-century 
meaning of these terms, as it is from Coke’s understanding that people 
in the eighteenth century primarily acquired their beliefs about 
Magna Carta.35 
Although there is some risk of anachronism in applying a term 
such as “separation of powers” to Magna Carta, Article 39 of the 
charter, in either of its original thirteenth-century forms, can fairly be 
 
 31.  See Suri Ratnapla, John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-evaluation, 
38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 204–05 (1993). 
 32.  See MOTT, supra note 27, at 42–44. 
 33.  2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 850 (Steve 
Sheppard ed., 2005).  
 34.  See id. at 853. 
 35.  See MOTT, supra note 27, at 78 (“While it is undoubtedly true that the Institutes 
leave much to be desired from the point of view of historical research, it really mattered little if 
it were historically accurate or not. The important thing is that the Institutes were regarded as 
accurate and consequently had a tremendous influence upon subsequent interpretations of 
Magna Carta.”). For more on Coke’s influence in the eighteenth century, see id. at 79, 89–90; 
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2, at 1681 (describing Coke’s influence as “unparalleled”). 
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described as a kind of separation-of-powers provision, in that it denied 
the King the ability to act in the absence of law from another source 
when such action would result in loss of property, imprisonment, or 
other criminal punishment imposed on the King’s subjects. More 
abstractly: according to Magna Carta, executive enforcement action 
resulting in loss of life, liberty, or property can take place only pursuant 
to general norms of conduct (“the law of the land”) or after 
determination by an institution other than the executive (“the lawful 
judgment of his peers”).36 Thus, “a 1368 royal commission to two 
men to seize and imprison another and take his goods . . . [was] 
held . . . void . . . because it authorized the commissioners ‘to take a 
man and his goods without indictment, suit of a party, or 
due process.’”37 
The idea that action depriving subjects of rights requires law to 
validate it is important enough to warrant a label. In this Article, I call 
this idea the “principle of legality.”38 This fundamental principle 
infuses the Constitution of 1788. It was there in the Constitution in 
the three-and-a-half years before the Fifth Amendment was ratified, 
 
 36.  See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2, at 1683–84. Quite possibly, the original 
understanding of this provision was that lawful deprivations required both the law of the land 
and a judgment of peers rather than either/or. See MOTT, supra note 27, at 3 n.8. Again, 
however, Coke’s contrary understanding is surely the most relevant one for interpreting the 
federal Constitution, and the weight of scholarly authority supports reading the provision in 
Magna Carta in the alternative. 
 37.  PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 136 (2014). 
 38.  In the Anglo-American tradition, the term “principle of legality” carries multiple 
meanings, ranging from the idea that criminal punishment requires pre-existing positive law, see 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 189, 190 (1985), to the idea that statutes should not lightly be construed to derogate from 
the common law, see, e.g., Dan Meagher, The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: 
Significance and Problems, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 413, 413–14 (2014), to a general statement of 
the rule of law and the protection of fundamental common law rights, see Douglas E. Edlin, 
From Ambiguity to Legality: The Future of English Judicial Review, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 396–
97 (2004). (I gather that in international law the term is essentially synonymous with the 
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws. See, e.g., John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The 
Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 38 (2002).) I am using the term in precisely the sense described in the text: 
the idea that governmental action is valid only when it is implementing lawful authority. 
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and it remains in the Constitution today, embodied in some of the 
document’s most basic structural features. 
The key structural feature of the American Constitution is the 
enumeration of limited institutional powers. The Constitution 
identifies institutions of the national government and then grants 
those institutions specific and delineated powers. “All legislative 
powers herein granted” are vested in Congress; the “executive Power” 
is vested in the President, and the “judicial Power” is vested in Article 
III courts.39 There are some modest tweaks to this basic distribution: 
the President is given the legislative-like presentment and veto 
power,40 the Congress is given the seemingly judicial power of 
impeachment,41 the Senate shares in the executive appointment and 
treaty-making powers,42 and the courts are permitted to receive the 
executive power of appointment in some cases.43 But the default 
scheme of the Constitution is to identify distinctive powers of 
government and to parcel out those powers to different institutions. 
Federal institutions can act only pursuant to the powers with which 
they are vested and any powers that are incidental to those expressly 
granted powers.44 
This scheme places a great deal of weight on the appropriate 
definitions of legislative, executive, and judicial power. The 
Constitution contains no express definitions of those terms. Nor can 
 
 39.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
 40.  See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3. One cannot call this power strictly “legislative” because the 
Article I vesting clause declares that all legislative powers are vested in Congress, which does not 
include the President. Accordingly, no presidential power can bear the label “legislative” within 
the Constitution. 
 41.  See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 42.  See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  The scope of those incidental powers is a topic for another time. The question, for 
example, whether there are powers ancillary to the case-deciding power that necessarily vest in 
the federal courts is daunting. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme 
Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 353–66 (2006); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and 
the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1500–11 
(2000); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural 
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 843–66 (2001). For a treatment of incidental legislative 
powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: 
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 78–103 (2017). 
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one readily find canonical definitions in founding-era materials. 
Indeed, as James Madison put it: 
Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science of 
government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with 
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the legislative, 
executive, and judiciary . . . . Questions daily occur in the course of 
practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, 
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.45 
That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison 
from categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in 
their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.”46 Nor did it stop 
John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an 
unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every society 
natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive authorities 
are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws depend entirely on 
a separation of them in the frame of government.”47 Nor did it prevent 
many state constitutions of the founding era from including 
separation-of-powers clauses that expressly distinguished, again 
without express definitions, legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers.48 Nor did it prevent the United States Constitution from 
basing its entire scheme of governance on the distinctions between 
those powers. However difficult it may be at the margins to 
distinguish the categories of power from each other, the founding 
generation assumed that there was a fact of the matter about those 
distinctions and that one could discern that fact in at least a large range 
of cases. The communicative meaning of the Constitution of 1788 
cannot be ascertained without reference to some such distinction, 
even if legal scholars or political scientists (adept or otherwise) find 
 
 45.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 286 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., Phila., 
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866). 
 46.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 382 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., Phila., 
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866). 
 47.  4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 579 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
 48.  See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX (“In the government of this 
Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, 
or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either 
of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: 
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”). 
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the distinction unhelpful or confusing. That is why Chief Justice John 
Marshall could say, without embarrassment: “The difference between 
the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the 
executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law . . . .”49 It is 
also why Alexander Hamilton could say of the federal judiciary that it 
has “neither FORCE [the executive power of enforcement] nor WILL 
[the legislative power to prescribe norms], but merely judgment.”50 
There is a core set of functions allocated to each power. This core is 
sufficient to generate the principle of legality within the context of 
the Constitution. 
Whatever doubts there may be at the margins of each power, the 
legislative power is the power to prescribe norms for the governance 
of society. That power operates against a baseline of customs and 
practice, which one might call general law; the legislative power, 
within its enumerated scope, can clarify, qualify, or alter the general 
law. Hence, as Chief Justice Marshall straightforwardly noted, “the 
legislature makes . . . the law.”51 The “essential” function of the 
executive power, as the name suggests, is to execute the laws.52 Sai 
Prakash’s and Steve Calabresi’s encyclopedic accounts of executive 
power under the Constitution demonstrate at least this much.53 
Similarly, the essence of judicial power is the power (and duty) to 
resolve disputes within the court’s jurisdiction according to governing 
law.54 In the words of James Wilson: “The judicial authority consists 
in applying, according to the principles of right and justice, the 
constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the 
 
 49.  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). 
 50.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 
Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866). 
 51.  Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 46. 
 52.  See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 701. 
 53.  See SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Prakash, supra 
note 52. 
 54.  See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY passim (2008). 
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manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties 
interested in them.”55 
The principle of legality flows naturally from these allocations of 
power. There must be law for the executive to execute. There must be 
law for the judiciary to construe and apply. That law can come from 
statutes or from the general law,56 but law there must be. Execution, 
construal, or application without law simply lies beyond the 
enumerated scope of executive and judicial power whenever that 
execution, construal, or application deprives subjects of rights. One 
does not need a due process of law clause to generate this principle of 
legality. It follows from—or, rather, is baked into—the nature of the 
powers granted to executive and judicial agents by the Constitution. 
To be sure, the President has some powers that can be effectuated 
without reliance on law from other sources, such as the pardon 
power57 or the power to convene Congress on special occasions.58 But 
those powers do not involve the deprivation of legally protected rights 
to life, liberty, or property and thus do not implicate the principle of 
legality. By contrast, the President’s treaty-making power, shared with 
the Senate, could implicate private rights. (Imagine, for instance, an 
extradition treaty or a treaty limiting shipping rights.) But the treaty 
power, as with the legislative power, is an express power to create new 
norms,59 which is why the Supremacy Clause lumps treaties with 
statutes as “the supreme Law of the Land.”60 When exercising the core 
 
 55.  1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 296 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). There 
are surprisingly few other words from the founding era describing the judicial power. See James 
S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998) (spending a 
great many pages finding surprisingly few words on the subject). Nonetheless, Wilson’s brief but 
potent account aptly sums up centuries of Anglo-American tradition. See HAMBURGER, supra 
note 37, at 146–47. 
 56.  It was determined early in the nation’s history that general law, as opposed to 
statutory law, cannot support a federal criminal prosecution. See United States v. Hudson, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). This Article is agnostic on that issue as an original matter. 
 57.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 58.  Id. art. II, § 3. The federal courts, by contrast, have no enumerated constitutional 
power beyond the “judicial Power” vested by Article III, save the power (which does not affect 
private rights) to appoint inferior officers when Congress so prescribes. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 59.  In my humble opinion, those new norms in treaties can only carry into effect other 
enumerated federal powers, but that is a story for another day. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
 60.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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“executive Power” to execute the laws, the President is bound by the 
principle of legality. From 1788 to December 14, 1791, the President 
could not, in the execution of the laws, deprive subjects of life, liberty, 
or property except pursuant to the law of the land or a valid court 
judgment. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause 
confirmed this fact,61 but it did not create or alter it. 
Something both obvious and momentous emerges from this 
analysis: the principle of legality, at least in its executive guise, is 
substantive rather than procedural. It concerns what the “executive 
Power” can do, not how or by what procedures it can do it. I will have 
more to say about this rather large point shortly, but the next stop on 
the journey concerns the judicial power. 
III. NOTICE 
When the term “due process of law” first appeared in an English 
statute in the fourteenth century, the term was peculiarly concerned 
with judicial action and required, inter alia, notice of suit by 
appropriate writ: “That no man of what Estate or Condition that he 
be, shall be put out of land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, 
nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer 
by due process of law.”62 This requirement of notice, which entails the 
opportunity to present a case for one’s position (“without being 
brought in answer”) before judicial deprivations of legally protected 
interests, has survived to the present day.63 While there can be lively 
dispute about what forms of notice are adequate and what steps a 
government must take to provide that notice,64 the bedrock 
requirement that some kind of notice be provided before a judicial 
deprivation of property or natural liberty is a basic part of American 
 
 61.  See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1005, 1042 (2011) (“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . is essentially a restriction on what the 
executive branch may do in the absence of a law.”). 
 62.  See Jurow, supra note 8, at 266 (quoting 28 Ed. III, ch. 3 (1354)) (discussing the 
writ-based origins of due process of law). 
 63.  The interests protected under this statute of 1354, as with those identified in Magna 
Carta, correspond quite well to the phrase “life, liberty, or property.” 
 64.  See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (deciding, in a 5–3 decision, that the 
state needed to take additional steps to notify a property owner before a tax sale when mailed 
notice was returned unclaimed). 
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law and has spawned an entire body of jurisprudence under the Due 
Process of Law Clauses.65 
The key point is that notice is a basic part of American law—so 
basic that it pre-dated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause. Notice is part and parcel of what it means to exercise “judicial 
Power” and did not need articulation in the Fifth Amendment to be 
required. In 1830, in Hollingsworth v. Barbour,66 the Supreme Court 
adopted the reasoning of a Kentucky circuit court: 
[B]y the general law of the land, no court is authorised to render a 
judgment or decree against any one or his estate; until after due 
notice by service of process to appear and defend. This principle is 
dictated by natural justice; and is only to be departed from in cases 
expressly warranted by law, and excepted out of the general rule.67 
The permissible departures and exceptions mentioned in the decision 
concerned in rem proceedings in which the seizure of property was 
deemed (however artificially) to be constructive notice of the action 
and statutes providing for notice by publication in limited 
circumstances. In all events, some kind of notice is an essential 
precondition to the exercise of “judicial Power”: “[T]he service of 
process, or notice, is necessary to enable a Court to exercise 
jurisdiction in a case; and if jurisdiction be taken where there has been 
no service of process, or notice, the proceeding is a nullity.”68 The early 
cases announcing the notice requirement did not rely on the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. No one, to my knowledge, 
has ever had the cheek to suggest that the notice requirement did not 
exist between June 6, 1788, and December 15, 1791. Rather, when 
federal courts were granted the “judicial Power” in 1788, a notice 
 
 65.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1850). 
 66.  Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466 (1830). 
 67.  Id. at 472. 
 68.  Lessee of Walden v. Craig’s Heirs, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 147, 154 (1840). 
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requirement came with the kitchen.69 Anything about notice 
contained in the Fifth Amendment was redundant. 
IV. PROCEDURAL FORMS 
Much of what we know today as due process law consists of the 
prescription of procedural forms for various actions by executive and 
judicial agents. What kinds of hearings must be held, and at what point 
in the legal process must they be provided before someone may be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property (whatever those terms turn out to 
mean)? Cases on these questions fill volumes, and books and articles 
on the subject fill shelves. The law of “procedural due process” infuses 
courses in constitutional law, administrative law, federal courts, and 
civil procedure, among others. What does the Constitution of 1788 
say about these matters? 
The Constitution expressly says relatively little about the 
procedural forms of federal governmental action. It says a great deal 
about the procedures to be employed in selecting the individuals who 
will serve as the various agents of the federal government, but once 
those agents are selected, the Constitution mostly goes silent about 
how they must do their jobs. The big exception is the detailed 
specification of procedures for exercising the legislative power (and 
the hard-to-classify presidential presentment power that accompanies 
it). The Constitution says quite a bit about the hoops that one must 
jump through in order to produce something that can be called a 
“law.”70 It says much less about the hoops that one must jump through 
in order to exercise the “executive Power” or the “judicial Power.” 
Indeed, it says essentially nothing about how the President should go 
about the task of law execution, beyond the procedurally unhelpful 
injunction to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”71 The 
procedures for exercising judicial power are expressly constrained only 
by a provision for trial by jury in criminal cases72 and a provision 
 
 69.  Notice is seemingly less of an issue with respect to the “executive Power.” No one 
expects a suspect to be given notice before the police show up to arrest him or her. 
 70.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 71.  Id. art. II, § 3. 
 72.  Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
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specifying a few evidentiary procedures for treason trials.73 And 
looming over the grand silence is the provision authorizing Congress 
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”74 Were all procedural questions about 
federal executive and judicial power thus left by the Constitution 
to statute? 
Notwithstanding the apparent silence, the Constitution actually 
says many profound things about the proper exercise of executive and 
judicial power. It does so in precisely the same way that it imposes the 
principle of legality on executive and judicial agents: through the 
Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses. 
Start with the procedural forms of judicial action. There was no 
reason for the Constitution to specify the form by which federal courts 
may act because that was so well understood that it was simply part of 
the “judicial Power” with which federal courts were vested. 
Federal courts can act only in a judicial manner, “through the 
traditional processes of the law, consisting of regular criminal or 
civil proceedings.”75 
It is maddeningly hard to pin down through references to 
founding-era sources what these “traditional” processes of law entail. 
Conceptually, distinguishing judicial from executive power is 
notoriously difficult, if only because of the historical origins of judicial 
power as an aspect of executive power.76 Even distinguishing judicial 
from legislative power is more difficult than might appear at first 
glance.77 Historically, court systems prior to the Constitution were 
many and diverse, so specifying, in essentialist fashion, the particular 
 
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places 
as the Congress may by Law have directed.”). 
 73.  Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”). 
 74.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 75.  HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 173. 
 76.  See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 103–
06 (1995). 
 77.  See John Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
295 (2016). 
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features of a “judicial” process from pre-constitutional practice is no 
easy feat. 
Nonetheless, the founding generation took for granted that there 
were established forms for the exercise of the judicial power that 
constituted part of the legal backdrop of the era. Consider the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. It went into considerable detail about the 
jurisdiction of the various federal courts that it established but said 
considerably less about the manner in which that jurisdiction would 
be exercised. Rather, it incorporated existing and well-understood 
practices as part of the background content of the judicial power. 
Federal courts were authorized to issue writs “agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law.”78 They could demand the production of 
evidence “by the ordinary rules of processes in chancery.”79 The forms 
of proof and evidence were to be “as of actions at common law.”80 
And an immediately succeeding statute said that equity and admiralty 
processes were to be “according to the course of the civil law.”81 In 
the founding era, there was no need to specify in detail precisely how 
federal courts were to carry out their constitutionally vested function. 
Everyone knew what a judicial process looked like.82 
There could, of course, be minor variations in procedures among 
courts, but if certain essential features were not present—such as 
notice, a right to be heard, an independent adjudicator, principles of 
evidence, and (at least in common law and criminal cases) a jury— 
then one simply was not dealing with an exercise of the “judicial 
Power.” Indeed, a mass of materials in the early years of the republic 
equated due process of law with judicial process. A prayer for relief at 
the end of a court pleading asked “that justice, by due process of law, 
may be done, in this case.”83 Statutes used the phrase “due process of 
law” as shorthand for judicial process.84 Corporate charters identified 
 
 78.  An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 
73, 82. 
 79.  Id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 82. 
 80.  Id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 88. 
 81.  An Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 94. 
 82.  See Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due”, 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
 83.  See, e.g., Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 24 (1795). 
 84.  See, e.g., Auld v. Norwood, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 361, 363 (1809) (citing a Virginia 
statute on fraudulent conveyances). 
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“due process of law” (presumably through quo warranto proceedings) 
as the mechanism for abrogating the charters.85 There was no need for 
the Fifth Amendment in 1791 to tell courts that they could not 
deprive people of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 
Due process of law just was, in an existential sense, what courts did 
when they were doing their jobs properly.86 
That leads to what, at least from the standpoint of modern 
doctrine, appear to be the most difficult questions of all in the area of 
due process: What happens when executive officials rather than courts 
are the agents of deprivation? What procedures must executive agents 
follow in order to deprive someone of life, liberty, or property? Surely 
there was not the same well-understood set of practices in the 
founding era that were necessary for valid exercise of the “executive 
Power” as there was for “judicial Power.” How would one know a 
procedurally appropriate executive deprivation of life, liberty or 
property when one saw it? 
These questions, which are the central inquiries of modern due 
process doctrine, all derive from a fundamental mistake. They assume 
that executive procedures determine, or are even relevant to, the 
lawfulness of an executive deprivation of life, liberty, or property. They 
do not and are not, unless valid statutes prescribe necessary procedures 
that must be followed. The simple fact is that executive agents cannot 
validly deprive someone of life, liberty, or property without legal 
authorization, in which case it is the law doing the depriving, or 
pursuant to a valid judicial order, in which case it is the judicial order 
that is doing the depriving, no matter what procedures are employed. 
The executive power, one must recall, is an implementational 
power. It can validly act to deprive subjects of rights only when there 
is law to enforce: a valid statute, a norm from the general law, or a 
valid court judgment. That is the essence of the principle of legality. 
Executive procedures, even highly formal, court-like executive 
procedures, may or may not be a good idea, and they may or may not 
serve any number of functions, but they cannot legitimate a 
deprivation that is not otherwise legitimate. And an executive 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 689 (1819). 
 86.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 157 (“The common law had its own ideals about 
the personnel, structure, and mode of proceeding of its courts—ideals that could be summed up 
as the due process of law.”). 
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deprivation that is anything more than the implementation of a valid 
statute, general law norm, or court decision is illegitimate. Due 
process of law requires either legislation, general law, or a court 
judgment for a deprivation of protected rights. No amount of 
executive procedures can substitute for these things. That is the 
substantive import of the principle of legality. 
Because the rise (and rise) of the administrative state tends to skew 
thinking on these matters, for purposes of ascertaining original 
meaning, it is important to keep clear several basic facts that make this 
conclusion less dramatic—or at least less dramatic to an eighteenth-
century audience—than it might seem today. 
First, and most importantly, a great deal of executive action does 
not involve the deprivation of any subject’s life, liberty, or property 
and thus does not implicate the principle of legality that helps define 
the “executive Power.” Philip Hamburger usefully distinguishes 
executive action that deprives legally protected rights, or that 
constrains subjects,87 from executive action that exercises coercion against 
non-subjects such as aliens,88 exercises coercion pursuant to 
enforcement of statutory duties without purporting to add any 
independent binding authority to the statute,89 administers benefits 
such as pensions or public land grants,90 or engages in other activities 
such as notice-giving, interpretation, or internal executive 
administration, none of which alter the legal landscape for subjects.91 
For all of these non-constraining, or non-rights-depriving, actions, 
legally required procedures are determined by statute or executive 
discretion rather than by constitutional command in all but the most 
 
 87.  See id. at 2–5. 
 88.  See id. at 192–93. Nathan Chapman has recently argued that notions of due process 
apply fully to aliens as a matter of original meaning. See Nathan Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2920776. Nothing in this Article turns on whether he is right. As with everything else 
pertaining to due process of law, the answers to questions of extraterritorial application of due 
process of law likely turn on the scope of the powers granted by the Constitution of 1788 rather 
than on the words of the Fifth Amendment. There is much to be said for Professor Chapman’s 
view that those powers are limited regardless of their objects, but that is a tale for another time. 
 89.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 84–85, 215–17. 
 90.  See id. at 193–98. 
 91.  See id. at 85–95. 
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extreme cases that implicate fiduciary principles.92 Outside of a 
fiduciary-based zone of arbitrariness, executive agents have a wide 
choice of procedures when they are not constraining subjects, limited 
only by legislation that is “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” federal powers. If no subjects are being deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, the Constitution is not much interested in what 
kinds of procedures executive agents employ for whatever they are 
doing. That is true under modern Fifth Amendment due process 
doctrine, which kicks in only when there is a deprivation of “life, 
liberty, or property,” and it was true under the original Constitution 
as well, from 1788 onwards. 
The difference between original law and modern law in this 
respect concerns the scope of interests whose deprivation is deemed 
to raise constitutional concerns. The demise of the right-privilege 
distinction that was formalized in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth93 heralded the extension of due process of law norms to the 
deprivation of all sorts of things, from government jobs to welfare 
benefits to licenses, that would fall under the administration-of-
benefits heading in earlier times.94 The story of that extension is for 
another time,95 as is any assessment of its wisdom. For present 
purposes, all we need to know is that, from the perspective of original 
meaning, executive action raises constitutional issues (apart from 
violations of fiduciary duties in extreme cases) only when it deprives 
rights—or, to put it another way, when it constrains subjects. That is 
a relatively modest subset of executive action. 
Second, and relatedly, in the course of engaging in executive 
action that does not deprive rights or constrain subjects, executive 
actors can often employ procedures that make their activity look very 
similar to legislative or judicial action. They can employ adjudicative 
procedures in fact-finding and the application of law to fact that look 
very similar to court proceedings, and they can employ rulemaking 
procedures that make executive rule-pronouncing activity seem very 
 
 92.  Executive agents, as with all federal governmental actors, have a fiduciary duty of 
care, and that duty limits the extent to which wholly arbitrary or inappropriate procedures can 
be employed in any tasks. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 44, at 131–35. 
 93.  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972). 
 94.  The “earlier times” persisted until the 1950s. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 
57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 
 95.  For a brief introduction, see LAWSON, supra note 7, at 853–927. 
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much like legislation. But as long as the outputs of these proceedings 
do not constrain subjects, none of this matters for constitutional 
purposes. Whether executive action implicates the principle of legality 
depends upon the substance of the executive action, not on what 
procedures the executive agents employ. 
Third, much executive action that appears to deprive people of 
rights or to constrain subjects actually does no such thing. Consider a 
prosecutor’s decision to pursue criminal charges. If the defendant is 
charged and deprived of liberty pre-trial, it is because of legislative 
action that arguably makes the conduct criminal and judicial action 
validating the arrest. If the defendant is convicted and sent to prison, 
it is the product of a judicial order of conviction pursuant to the 
statute. If the executive agent chooses not to prosecute, that is simply 
a dispensation, just as a decision to prosecute does not create any new 
liability that did not previously exist. You are not deprived of anything 
because an executive agent fails to grant you a favor to which you have 
no legal entitlement. Put another way: there is no violation of the 
principle of legality when an executive agent applies the law to you. 
Any deprivations are not really the result of executive action, in the 
sense that the executive action does not itself create any of the legal 
norms that result in the deprivation. The executive agent merely acts 
in accordance with statutes (the law of the land) and judicial orders 
(the judgment of his peers). The principle of legality does not prevent 
executive actors from acting. It prevents executive actors from 
depriving subjects of rights without law to back it up. The execution 
of valid laws or judicial orders that effect deprivations is not itself a 
deprivation without due process of law forbidden by the principle 
of legality. 
Fourth, the foregoing considerations raise a question of timing in 
some situations. Even where deprivations are authorized by statute in 
principle, there are circumstances in which executive actors inevitably 
deprive persons of legally protected rights without a prior 
determination by a court that the deprivation is authorized. Consider 
a naval vessel on the high seas that is enforcing a wartime (or at least 
time-of-hostilities) embargo on shipping involving enemy ports. The 
officer commanding the naval vessel believes that he has found a ship 
in violation of the embargo. This is the late eighteenth or early 
nineteenth century, so timely communication from ship to shore is not 
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an option.96 Must every naval vessel come equipped with an Article III 
judge on board to determine the lawfulness of seizures on the spot? 
One can replicate the same concerns, with less dramatic effect, in more 
mundane settings on land. Arrests of criminal suspects present some 
time lag between a deprivation of liberty and an adjudication of 
probable cause, much less of guilt. Do these actions violate the 
principle of legality? 
The answer depends on whether the deprivation is authorized by 
statute or general law. If the naval officer seizes goods that violate an 
embargo, there is no violation of the principle of legality because the 
officer has acted in accordance with the statute, assuming that the 
statute is valid and the officer complies with both the substantive and 
procedural terms of the statute. If a person is detained by arrest and is 
guilty of the charged crime, there is no violation of the principle of 
legality because the deprivation is authorized by the law of the land, 
again assuming that the criminal statute is itself valid. And if a health 
inspector summarily seizes and destroys chickens in a warehouse on 
the ground that the chickens violate valid health regulations, there is 
no problem if the chickens are, in fact and law, unhealthful and if the 
legislature had power to regulate the healthfulness of chickens.97 
Obviously, if the underlying statutes exceed the power of the 
legislature and are therefore unconstitutional, they provide no 
authorization for actions of enforcement. An agent who enforces an 
unconstitutional law acts without legal authorization and thus violates 
the principle of legality. But an agent who executes a constitutional 
law does exactly what the “executive Power” is supposed to do. 
How would one determine whether those factual and legal 
predicates for valid executive action are present? The ordinary 
mechanism for obtaining that determination would be an action for 
damages, in a proper court, against the executive actor. Conceivably, 
one could try to bring an action for injunction if one knows that the 
deprivation is coming; and if the expected deprivation is of life or 
liberty, there is a chance that one will succeed in an injunction action 
because the remedy at law will likely be inadequate. A tort suit by 
one’s surviving family is not really an adequate remedy for an unlawful 
 
 96.  The example is based on Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 97.  The example is adapted from North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 
211 U.S. 306 (1908). 
2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  2:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
636 
execution, and a tort action for wrongful imprisonment does not quite 
do the trick for an unlawful detention. If the expected deprivation is 
of property, however, there is no obvious reason, in most cases, why a 
damages remedy is not adequate, or at least as adequate as a damages 
remedy is for any legal wrong,98 so damages it will likely be. 
Those familiar with the history of administrative law know that, 
until relatively recently, suing for damages was precisely the 
mechanism by which the legality, including the constitutional legality, 
of executive action was typically challenged. In Little v. Barreme99 in 
1804, for example, Captain Little seized goods on the high seas from 
a ship sailing from a French port pursuant to a presidential directive 
to naval officers to be wary of goods heading to and from France 
during the quasi-war of that time. Unfortunately for Captain Little, 
Congress had authorized seizure only of goods sailing to, and not 
from, French ports. Captain Little got sued, and even though he was 
acting under presidential orders, the statute did not actually authorize 
the executive action. Captain Little accordingly faced a significant 
judgment for damages.100 
Today, this mechanism is largely unavailable in practice because of 
the rise (and rise) of the doctrine of official immunity, which removes 
the strict liability for unlawful action that prevailed during the 
founding era.101 For now, it is sufficient to note that the rise (and rise) 
of the administrative state has left many casualties in its wake, and the 
doctrine of executive accountability is among the many. From the 
standpoint of original meaning rather than modern doctrine, damages 
actions are the vehicle for dealing with problems of timing. Executive 
 
 98.  See, e.g., Cruickshank v. Bidwell, 176 U.S. 73 (1900) (denying an injunctive remedy 
against a customs collector where a damage remedy was available). If the lost property is real 
property (rather than tea, as in Cruickshank), there may be reasons to doubt the efficacy of a 
damages remedy, which is why contracts for land are generally specifically enforceable. 
 99.  Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170. 
 100.  Id. at 179. He was bailed out by a private bill. See Act for the Relief of George Little, 
ch. 4, 6 Stat. 63 (1807). This kind of indemnification was, perhaps unsurprisingly, evidently 
fairly common in the founding era. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs 
and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 (2010). For more on Little v. Barreme, see infra note 102 and 
accompanying text. 
 101.  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–19 (1982). 
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agents can deprive without prior court determinations all they want, 
but they do so at their legal peril.102 
The Constitution of 1788 has very strong ideas about the nature 
of executive power and how it must be implemented. Those ideas are 
substantive, not procedural. They concern what executive power is 
and what executive power can do, not what kind of hearings executive 
agents choose to provide. To the extent that those ideas are replicated 
in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, that clause 
embodies a very strong principle of what can meaningfully be called 
substantive due process. Yet unlike modern substantive due process, it 
is not about limits on legislative action; it is about limits on executive 
action. But it is most definitely about substance. 
Where this all went wrong in the case law—to the point where 
emphasis on the forms of executive hearings and other procedures 
came at the expense of the principle of legality—is a lengthy story for 
another time. But a few brief observations on where the key missteps 
might have happened are appropriate here. 
The Supreme Court’s first encounter with the principle of legality 
of which I am aware, though it did not use that terminology, was Little 
v. Barreme, and the court’s analysis seems consistent with the analysis 
herein. In finding that executive action contrary to law—even in time 
of conflict, on the high seas on a naval vessel, and pursuant to 
presidential directives—was invalid and thus provided no defense of 
legal authorization against a common-law damages action, Chief 
Justice Marshall wrote: 
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the 
opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not give 
a right, they might yet excuse from damages. I was much inclined to 
think that a distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and 
those of military officers; and between proceedings within the body 
of the country and those on the high seas. That implicit obedience 
which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors, which 
indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared 
to me strongly to imply the principle that those orders, if not to 
 
 102.  Does this mean that pre-modern law enforcement officials acted at their peril if they 
arrested people without judicially-approved warrants? Of course it does—subject to the proviso 
that law enforcement officials are themselves a relatively modern development. See Jerome Hall, 
Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566 (1936); Roger 
Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685 (2001). 
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perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person whose general 
duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his country 
in a situation which in general requires that he should obey them. I 
was strongly inclined to think that where, in consequence of orders 
from the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention, 
the claim of the injured party for damages would be against that 
government from which the orders proceeded, and would be a 
proper subject for negotiation. But I have been convinced that I was 
mistaken, and I have receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in 
that of my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change 
the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those 
instructions would have been a plain trespass.103 
The law is the law, and executive orders or proclamations cannot 
change it. So far, so good. 
The next federal judicial landmark in the application of the 
principle of legality, with a more mixed prognosis, came more than 
half a century later in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and 
Improvement Co.104 The case involved a statute that, upon first glance 
(and second glance as well), appears to be an extraordinary assertion 
of governmental power. The Supreme Court’s opinion does not 
reproduce the text of the statute, but that text merits reproduction 
(omitting some portions involving sureties and notice of sale that are 
not relevant here): 
[I]f any collector of the revenue, receiver of public money, or other 
officer who shall have received the public money before it is paid into 
the treasury of the United States, shall fail to render his account, or 
pay over the same in the manner, or within the time required by law, 
it shall be the duty of the first comptroller of the treasury to cause to 
be stated the account of such collector, receiver of public money, or 
other officer, exhibiting truly the amount due to the United States, 
and certify the same to the agent of the treasury, who is hereby 
authorized and required to issue a warrant of distress against such 
delinquent officer and his sureties, directed to the marshal of the 
district in which such delinquent officer and his surety or sureties 
shall reside . . . ; therein specifying the amount with which such 
delinquent is chargeable, and the sums, if any, which have been paid. 
 
 103.  Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179. 
 104.  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272 (1856). 
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And the marshal authorized to execute such warrant, shall, by 
himself or by his deputy, proceed to levy and collect the sum 
remaining due, by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of such 
delinquent officer; having given ten days’ previous notice of such 
intended sale . . . ; and if the goods and chattels be not sufficient to 
satisfy the said warrant, the same may be levied upon the person of 
such officer, who may be committed to prison, there to remain until 
discharged by due course of law. . . . And the amount due by any 
such officer as aforesaid, shall be, and the same is hereby declared to 
be, a lien upon the lands, tenements, and hereditaments of such 
officer and his sureties, from the date of a levy in pursuance of the 
warrant of distress issued against him or them . . . . And for want of 
goods and chattels of such officer, or his surety or sureties, sufficient 
to satisfy any warrant of distress issued pursuant to the provisions of 
this act, the land, tenements, and hereditaments of such officer . . . 
may and shall be sold by the marshal of such district or his deputy; 
and . . . shall give a valid title against all persons claiming under such 
delinquent officer, or his surety or sureties.105 
Considering just this section of the statute (and another section 
will prove important in a moment), the law represents a legislative 
instruction to executive agents to seize and sell a person’s property, 
and where necessary to imprison the person, without a prior judicial 
determination of liability. And, yes, people were actually imprisoned 
under this statute.106 The relevant treasury agents under this law have 
the mandatory duty to issue and enforce the appropriate distress 
 
 105.  Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 107, § 2, 3 Stat. 592, 592–93. 
 106.  See Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558). The case 
involved a naval purser whose account was found deficient. A marshal found insufficient property 
to satisfy the debt and had Randolph imprisoned. Randolph brought a habeas corpus action, 
raising broad-based challenges to the constitutionality of the Act of May 15, 1820, under, inter 
alia, Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Chief Justice Marshall, who heard the case on 
circuit along with district judge Philip Barbour, took the Article III argument very seriously: 
The persons who are directed by the act of congress to ascertain the debt due from a 
delinquent receiver of public money, and to issue process to compel the payment of 
that debt, do not compose a court ordained and established by congress, nor do they 
hold offices during good behaviour . . . . They are, consequently, incapable of 
exercising any portion of the judicial power, and the act which attempts to confer it, 
is absolutely void. 
Id. at 254. Both judges avoided the constitutional questions by construing the statute not to 
apply to Randolph, albeit for somewhat different reasons. See id. at 251–52 (Judge Barbour 
construing the statute not to allow reopening of accounts); id. at 254–55 (Chief Justice Marshall 
construing the statute not to extend to pursers). 
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warrants. Issuance of a warrant not only makes possible the 
aforementioned deprivations of liberty and property but also, in the 
event of a deficiency, imposes liens on property and authorizes judicial 
sales that divest title from all other claimants. All of this is set in motion 
by executive action determining the existence and amount of a 
deficiency without recourse to the courts. 
Section four of the statute brings the judiciary into the picture; 
any who think themselves aggrieved by a distress warrant can seek an 
injunction against the warrant in federal court.107 But the catches to 
this judicial review provision are (1) that the person seeking an 
injunction must initiate the action and then post a bond, indicating 
that the burden of proof is on the claimant, and (2) that even the 
issuance of an injunction against enforcement action under a distress 
warrant does not “in any manner impair the lien produced by the 
issuing of such warrant.”108 
Taken as a whole, this procedure looks like exactly the kind of 
executive action that both the principle of legality and Article III of 
the Constitution are designed to prevent. Under this scheme, 
executive agents can sell people’s property and imprison them on the 
agents’ own say-so. Subsequent judicial determinations, even in favor 
of the party opposing the warrant, do not cancel out all of the legal 
effects of the distress warrant because they leave in place the lien on 
the collector’s property.109 The plaintiffs in Murray’s Lessee, who 
asserted a claim under a common-law levy of execution that pre-dated 
the judicial sale under the distress warrant but post-dated the 
 
 107.  § 4, 3 Stat. at 595. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Whether the requirements of initiation of judicial action by the target of the warrant 
and posting of a bond, by themselves, render the scheme potentially a violation of the principle 
of legality is a more difficult question. I am inclined to think that they do, since they give a 
presumptive legal effect to the executive action, but the law has been consistently contrary to 
my position. See, e.g., McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877) (“It can hardly be necessary 
to answer an argument which excludes from the definition of due process of law all that 
numerous class of remedies in which, by the rules of the court or by legislative provisions, a party 
invoking the powers of a court of justice is required to give that security which is necessary to 
prevent its process from being used to work gross injustice to another.”). 
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imposition of a lien under the statute, made these constitutional 
arguments against the statute with gusto.110 
From the standpoint of the principle of legality, the obvious 
response to these arguments is that they are arguments against a 
statute, not against executive action taken of its own accord, and that 
the executive action was thus entirely in accord with the law of the 
land. Congress specified the executive procedures in this statute in 
gruesome detail. It made application of the statute mandatory on the 
treasury. The statute dictated, in painstaking fashion, exactly how 
warrants must be issued, enforced, and executed. The executive agents 
who issued distress warrants against the collector in this case followed 
the statute to the letter.111 Factually, no one disputed that the 
collector—the infamous Samuel Swartwout—had swindled the 
government out of more than one million dollars.112 No one claimed 
that the executive agents had exceeded their statutory authority or 
gone after the wrong person. Isn’t that exactly what the principle of 
legality demands, and isn’t that exactly what this proceeding delivered? 
If the statute itself was constitutionally valid, then the answer has 
to be “yes.” Deprivations pursuant to constitutional statutes are 
lawful, provided that the statutes’ substantive and procedural 
prescriptions are followed. The primary question in Murray’s Lessee 
was thus not really whether the executive action was constitutional but 
whether the statute that authorized, and indeed mandated, the 
executive action was constitutional as a law “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” federal powers.113 While the opinion by 
Justice Curtis in Murray’s Lessee covered a lot of territory—some of 
it unsound as we will see—at one point, it settled on exactly the 
right analysis: 
Among the legislative powers of congress are the powers “to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and 
provide for the common defence and welfare of the United States, 
to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy, and to 
 
 110.  See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
272–73 (1856). 
 111.  See id. at 275 (“No objection has been taken to the warrant on account of any defect 
or irregularity in the proceedings which preceded its issue. It is not denied that they were in 
conformity with the requirements of the act of congress.”). 
 112.  One million dollars in 1839 would have been a big deal even for Dr. Evil. 
 113.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution those powers.” What officers should be appointed to 
collect the revenue thus authorized to be raised, and to disburse it 
in payment of the debts of the United States; what duties should be 
required of them; when and how, and to whom they should account, 
and what security they should furnish, and to what remedies they 
should be subjected to enforce the proper discharge of their duties, 
congress was to determine. In the exercise of their powers, they have 
required collectors of customs to be appointed; made it incumbent 
on them to account, from time to time, with certain officers of the 
treasury department, and to furnish sureties, by bond, for the 
payment of all balances of the public money which may become due 
from them. And by the act of 1820, now in question, they have 
undertaken to provide summary means to compel these officers—
and in case of their default, their sureties—to pay such balances of 
the public money as may be in their hands. 
The power to collect and disburse revenue, and to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into 
effect, includes all known and appropriate means of effectually 
collecting and disbursing that revenue, unless some such means 
should be forbidden in some other part of the constitution. The 
power has not been exhausted by the receipt of the money by the 
collector. Its purpose is to raise money and use it in payment of the 
debts of the government; and, whoever may have possession of the 
public money, until it is actually disbursed, the power to 
use those known and appropriate means to secure its due 
application continues.114 
To be sure, while this is the right analytical approach, I am not at 
all certain that this is the right answer. That is, I am not at all certain 
that prescription of this particular executive procedure, including the 
power to imprison the debtor, is a valid exercise of Congress’s power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause—unless one can say, and one 
might well be able to say, that accepting the position of collector 
amounts to a waiver of any constitutional claims that one might 
otherwise have.115 Quite possibly, Article III requires judicial action in 
order for any person to be imprisoned pursuant to federal law, at least 
 
 114.  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281. 
 115.  The idea that one could waive claims sounding in due process of law was settled by 
1857. See Bank of Colom. v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243–44 (1819). 
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outside of executive action in war zones pursuant to the law of war.116 
I am saying only that the Court in Murray’s Lessee hit upon the right 
analytical approach. The Court considered the right questions 
regardless of whether it reached the right answers. 
The Court was thus correct, but only in a backhanded sense, 
to say: 
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any 
process which might be devised. The . . . [Due Process of Law 
Clause] is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and 
judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to 
leave congress free to make any process “due process of law,” by its 
mere will.117  
The first sentence is correct, but the second is far off-base. It is not 
really the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause that 
constrains the federal legislative power in this regard, but rather the 
enumerations of legislative power in the Constitution. If those powers 
do not allow Congress to pass a statute empowering the executive in 
a particular fashion, then executive action under that statute is 
unauthorized. Invoking the Due Process of Law Clause rather than 
the doctrine of enumerated powers for this purpose is a conceptual 
mistake, unless the claim is that due process of law contains more limits 
than do the enumerated powers.  
At the very least, in any instance in which Congress exceeds its 
enumerated powers, it is a mistake to turn to the Due Process of Law 
Clause rather than those enumerations as the source of the limitation. 
And, quite possibly, this particular conceptual mistake is what set the 
law down the wrong path of thinking of the Due Process of Law 
Clause as (1) a source of procedural rather than substantive constraints 
on the executive and (2) an independent source of substantive 
constraints on the legislature. Neither use is an obvious manifestation 
 
 116.  For the same reasons, I have long been dubious about any inherent congressional 
power to imprison for contempt. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) 
(unpersuasively allowing such a power). 
 117.  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276. 
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of the principle of legality. The latter use, however, may have a non-
obvious connection to due process of law, to which we now turn. 
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE LEGALITY? 
Through the scheme of enumerated powers, the original 
Constitution limits the substance of what executive agents can do by 
requiring that executive agents act pursuant to valid law. It is easy to 
see how “due process of law” makes reference to this idea. The 
Constitution also limits the power of Congress through the 
enumeration of limited legislative powers that are “herein granted.” If 
Congress enacts a statute that exceeds its enumerated powers, the 
statute cannot serve as valid law to authorize executive or judicial 
deprivations of rights. Conceivably, one might try to describe the 
enactment of such a statute itself as a violation of due process of law, 
even if Congress followed the procedures laid out in Article I, Section 
7. If that description is some kind of interpretative error, it appears to 
be harmless. If the statute really exceeds Congress’s enumerated 
powers and is therefore unconstitutional, nothing of substance is 
lost—or gained—by layering on a claimed violation of due process of 
law. Violating two constitutional provisions or principles is not worse 
than violating one; the action is unconstitutional in either case. If one 
wants to reflect the principle of enumerated powers in the Due Process 
of Law Clause and call it a kind of “substantive due process,” it is hard 
to see what difference that will make.118 
But what “substantive due process” usually means these days is a 
limitation on legislative powers that goes beyond a straightforward 
enumerated powers violation and that does not implicate any express 
restriction on legislative power found in the Constitution. Is there 
 
 118.  Nonetheless, I am doubtful, as a conceptual matter, whether that is an appropriate 
use of “due process of law.” Article I, Section 7 declares to be “law” anything that clears its 
procedural hurdles. The language “shall be a law” suggests that those procedures are both 
necessary and sufficient to give the label “law” to entities that emerge from such a process. The 
reason that such “laws” do not satisfy the principle of legality by authorizing valid executive or 
judicial action is that they are superseded by a hierarchically superior form of law—the 
Constitution—that binds executive, judicial, and legislative actors alike. Norms that lose out to 
other norms in a conflict-of-laws duel can still be laws. If Congress passes an unconstitutional 
statute, and the Constitution is amended to validate the statute, Congress does not need to re-
enact the statute. It was law from the beginning. Accordingly, I would not call enactment of an 
unconstitutional law a “due process of law” violation. 
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room in an originalist account of the Constitution for any such thing, 
from whatever source and however labeled? 
The originalist answer, perhaps surprisingly to some, is yes. And 
the answer of “yes” goes beyond what Professors Chapman and 
McConnell have in mind when they say that Congress 
cannot  act  in  an essentially “judicial” or “executive” fashion 
directly  to  deprive  people of rights.119 It includes at least some 
instances  in  which  Congress violates the Constitution by passing 
“prospective  and  general laws . . . [that are] enforced by means of 
impeccable procedures.”120 
The Constitution is, most fundamentally, a fiduciary instrument. 
By that I do not mean that, as a matter of either private obligation or 
political theory, it represents a valid transfer of authority from some 
persons to others. I simply mean that, as a descriptive matter, the 
Constitution falls most naturally into a family of documents known to 
eighteenth-century persons as fiduciary instruments. A book-length 
argument for this proposition can be found elsewhere.121 The 
significance for due process of law is that fiduciary instruments carry 
in their wake a number of background interpretative rules, derived 
from the various rights and duties that accompany fiduciary 
relationships as a default. One of the most basic fiduciary duties is a 
duty of care on the part of the agent. The agent must exercise 
authority on behalf of the principal with some measure of attentiveness 
and skill. To the extent that Congress is seen as a fiduciary agent, a 
duty of care accompanies all of its grants of power. At a minimum, this 
duty grounds something like a “rational basis” review of congressional 
action for arbitrariness. At a maximum, it imposes even more 
stringent  requirements of reasonableness. The detailed case for these 
propositions is set out elsewhere.122 
Could one read this duty of care into the Due Process of Law 
Clause so that action that falls below the standard of that fiduciary 
duty lacks due process of law? To the extent that the Due Process of 
Law Clause includes enumerated-powers limitations on Congress, 
 
 119.  See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2, at 1677–79. 
 120.  Id. at 1679. 
 121.  See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 44. 
 122.  See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and 
the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
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there is no reason to exclude this limitation—which, after all, is simply 
an implicit but nonetheless quite real limitation on the granted 
enumerated powers. If one wants to call this fiduciary principle 
“substantive due process,” no great consequence ensues even if such 
a move is interpretatively unsound. 
Whether that move from fiduciary duty to due process of law is 
interpretatively unsound depends on whether the idea of due process 
of law has application to legislative action. The Supreme Court said 
yes in Murray’s Lessee in 1856, at least with respect to legislation that 
changes traditional procedural forms. The next year, in the Dred Scott 
decision,123 the Court went the full distance to use the Due Process of 
Law Clause to invalidate a substantive law regulating slavery in federal 
territory.124 Before that time, as a historical matter, there was 
something of a back-and-forth about the extent to which ideas of due 
process of law applied to legislation.125 Because there is no reason to 
suppose that anything contained in “due process of law” as it might 
apply to legislation would impose different or stricter requirements 
than do background fiduciary principles, nothing in the present 
analysis depends on the resolution of that controversy, and I 
accordingly pass it over. Whatever can plausibly, or perhaps even 
implausibly, be read into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause with respect to congressional action is already contained in the 
Constitution of 1788. 
This Article, which is an attempt to uncover the original meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, could end right 
 
 123.  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 124.  The Court said: 
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or 
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular 
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, 
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. 
Id. at 450. The big problem with this argument is the premise that Congress has no enumerated 
power to regulate slavery in federal territory. Congress has power under the Territories Clause 
to prescribe rules for the governance of federal territory, and that includes the power to declare 
certain forms of property contraband. Even without such a declaration, the mere absence of 
positive law providing affirmatively for slavery would be sufficient to end a slave relationship 
upon entry into such territory, since slavery was purely a creature of positive law and the Fugitive 
Slave Clause by its terms has no application to federal territory. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 
3. More detailed thoughts on Dred Scott can be found elsewhere. See GARY LAWSON & GUY 
SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY 197–201 (2004). 
 125.  See MOTT, supra note 27, at 98–101, 123, 141–42. 
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here. Perhaps it should end right here. It might, however, be valuable 
to consider why and how the contemporary meaning of “due process 
of law” has strayed so far from its original meaning, so that instead of 
talking about the principle of legality and enumerated powers, or even 
fiduciary duties, we today mostly talk about hearings, oral 
proceedings, cross-examination, and other procedures. For that part 
of the story, which I tell with some reluctance, we move to the second 
half of the nineteenth century. 
VI. POST-BELLUM DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
The death knell for a sound understanding of due process of law 
in the Fifth Amendment was probably the Civil War and the ensuing 
rise of the administrative state in the Progressive Era. Doctrinally and 
historically, the Fifth Amendment was effectively deranged by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The ensuing discussion of post-Civil War case law must be read 
with a great deal of caution. The purpose of the discussion is to locate 
in the evolution of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine some reasons 
why Fifth Amendment doctrine strayed so far from its original 
meaning. A discussion of that kind makes some assumptions about 
doctrinal development that are difficult to defend. It assumes (1) that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine was built from the prior 
Fifth Amendment doctrinal foundation, (2) that there was some kind 
of feedback mechanism through which Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine could affect Fifth Amendment doctrine, and, most 
importantly, (3) that case-law development under either clause was in 
fact driven by doctrinal considerations rather than policy. As Nettie 
Woolhandler pointed out in a dead-on comment to a draft of this 
Article, one might well be able to explain the entire history of 
Fourteenth Amendment due process development solely by reference 
to the rise of the administrative state, with no role necessary for the 
kinds of doctrinal machinations described below. Nonetheless, I offer 
the following account as suggestive of one possible contribution to 
the development of modern doctrine, with no accompanying claim 
about the strength of that contribution. I suspect that the influence of 
these doctrinal considerations was more than zero, but I cannot prove 
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it, and a reader who puts down the Article at this point is 
easily forgiven. 
Up through 1868, for reasons that have already been discussed at 
length, it was possible to pay no serious attention to the language of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. The clause added 
nothing of substance to constitutional discourse, and its use in 
doctrine, as Murray’s Lessee and Dred Scott graphically illustrate, was 
more likely to lead to confusion than to correct interpretation. It was 
in many respects a blessing that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
of Law Clause was not often invoked. But that relative neglect of the 
Due Process of Law Clause meant that, prior to the Civil War, there 
was no body of established federal case law construing the clause. 
There was a great deal of state case law interpreting various due process 
of law or law of the land clauses in state constitutions,126 but there was 
nothing of note at the federal level. As late as 1877, the Supreme 
Court could say “that the constitutional meaning or value of the 
phrase ‘due process of law,’ remains to-day without that satisfactory 
precision of definition which judicial decisions have given to nearly all 
the other guarantees of personal rights found in the constitutions of 
the several States and of the United States.”127 
When the Court made this observation in 1877, it made it in the 
context of a second due process of law clause that had been added to 
the Constitution less than a decade beforehand. Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, provides in relevant part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
 
 126.  See Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. 
COMMENT. 339, 346–59 (1987). 
 127.  Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1878); see also id. at 103–04 (“It is 
not a little remarkable, that while this provision has been in the Constitution of the United 
States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for nearly a century, and 
while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that government have been 
exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its 
branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or 
the more enlarged theatre of public discussion.”).  
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.128  
While there was little reason up to that point to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause against a limited federal 
government, whose scheme of enumerated and separated powers 
already included everything plausibly attributable to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, there was plenty of reason 
to invoke the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against all manner of actions of state and local 
governments, especially after the central substantive provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was eviscerated in the Slaughter-House Cases 
in 1873.129 And that is precisely what happened. Even by 1877, the 
Court could complain:  
[W]hile it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the 
power of the States, only a very few years, the docket of this court is 
crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that State courts 
and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.130  
The Court at that point could not easily escape pronouncing on the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. 
Nor was it clear, from the standpoint of original meaning, what those 
pronouncements were supposed to say. 
It is very clear what “due process of law” means in the context of 
a limited government of constitutionally separated powers that is 
already subject to the principle of legality. It is much less clear what 
“due process of law” means in the context of governments that are 
not otherwise subject to the Constitution’s enumeration-of-powers 
and separation-of-powers schemes. The Constitution of 1788 says 
almost nothing about how state governments must be structured. It 
does mandate that every state have a “Republican Form of 
 
 128.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 129.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Slaughter-House Cases 
are beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the weight of modern originalist 
scholarship suggests that the cases wrongly, and much too narrowly, construed the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under 
State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are 
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 73 (2008). 
 130. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 104. 
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Government,”131 and in several places the Constitution assumes that 
states will have traditional governmental structures that include 
legislatures,132 executives,133 and courts,134 but that is all; there is little 
reason to think that the Constitution was understood in 1788 to 
impose specific structural rules on state governments short of 
prohibitions on monarchy or direct Athenian-style democracy.135 
There is nothing to suggest that Massachusetts must understand 
“executive” or “judicial” powers to be exactly what the federal 
Constitution envisions them to be. If, however, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause means the same thing as 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, and if the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause means the separation-of-
powers-inspired principle of legality, does the Fourteenth Amendment 
thereby impose a specific separation-of-powers regime on the states by 
constitutional command? 
The Court in 1877 in Davidson v. City of New Orleans suggested 
as much: 
But when, in the year of grace 1866 [sic], there is placed in the 
Constitution of the United States a declaration that “no State shall 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law,” can a State make any thing due process of law which, by its 
own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this is to hold 
that the prohibition to the States is of no avail, or has no application 
where the invasion of private rights is effected under the forms of 
State legislation. It seems to us that a statute which declares in terms, 
and without more, that the full and exclusive title of a described piece 
of land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would, 
 
 131.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 132.  See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 4; id. 
art. VI, cl. 2. 
 133.  See id. art. IV, § 4; id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 134.  See id. art. VI, cl. 2–3. 
 135.  Do state referenda violate the Guarantee Clause? Quite possibly yes; I hope to explore 
the subject in future work. 
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if effectual, deprive A. of his property without due process of law, 
within the meaning of the constitutional provision.136 
This passage makes perfect sense with respect to the national 
government. Congress has no enumerated power to shift land titles 
from A to B. Perhaps it could be done by authorizing an exercise of 
the power of eminent domain, but (1) just compensation would have 
to be provided to A and (2) it was quite doubtful at that time, and as 
a matter of original meaning, whether the federal government actually 
had a power of eminent domain to exercise.137 A court could 
accomplish the task if there was substantive law prescribing the shift 
in titles, but not otherwise. The executive similarly could not act 
without law. One would not need the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
of Law Clause to conclude that Congress cannot declare the property 
of A to be the property of B. One need simply examine the 
enumerated powers of Congress and find none that does the trick and 
then apply the most basic form of the principle of legality that has any 
application to legislation. Even in federal territory, where Congress 
has the powers of a general government, its exercise of those powers 
is limited by fiduciary duties, which would make a straight-up transfer 
of land from A to B, without anything more, very difficult to defend. 
When one moves to state governments, however, matters are very 
different. Without the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no obvious 
federal constitutional prohibition against a state law taking property 
from A and giving it to B. The federal Constitution does not empower 
state governments, so it does not function for them as a source of 
fiduciary duties.138 The federal Constitution does not create or limit 
the institutions of state governments, so it does not impose upon them 
the principle of legality through a scheme of separated powers. It is 
quite possible that every state’s own constitution prohibits taking 
property from A and giving it to B. It is quite possible (and I would 
say true) that natural law forbids it. It is remotely possible, I suppose, 
that a “Republican Form of Government” is incompatible with that 
 
 136.  Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1878). 
 137.  See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 44, at 94–96; William Baude, Rethinking the 
Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738 (2013). 
 138.  There are modest exceptions, dealing with such matters as federal elections and 
federal constitutional amendments, and in those limited settings, the federal Constitution 
imposes fiduciary duties on the states. That has nothing to do with the kind of legislation with 
which due process of law cases have been concerned. 
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kind of naked act of title transfer, though I would have to be 
convinced by evidence that I have never seen that the eighteenth-
century concept of republicanism goes to that degree of substance as 
well as form. The original, pre-Civil War federal Constitution simply 
was not designed to police all manner of state mischief. It polices only 
very specific forms of state mischief, and transfers of title from A to B 
implicate those kinds of mischief only when they impair the obligation 
of contract.139 
How might the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment change 
things? The Court in Davidson in 1877 did not really explain how the 
Due Process of Law Clause would invalidate a legislative act of title 
transfer, though it assumed that it would do so. There are several 
possible grounds for such an assumption. One is to say that the Due 
Process of Law Clause is a font of natural law and prohibits A-to-B 
transfers for that reason. That is not an impossible position to defend 
by any means,140 and this Article is officially agnostic on whether that 
is a good account of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original 
meaning.141 Alternatively, perhaps the Court was saying that undoing 
vested property titles is a judicial function and therefore cannot be 
directly performed by the legislature. Maybe the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause forbids state legislatures 
from engaging in activities that are “in their nature” judicial or 
executive. Again, this is not an impossible position to defend,142 and it 
might even be correct in many states as a matter of state constitutional 
 
 139.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 140.  See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536–37 (1884); Gedicks, supra note 17; 
Sandefur, supra note 26. 
 141.  To be sure, such a position is in some tension with the Constitution’s uniformly 
positivist account of what makes something “law.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Harrison, 
supra note 11, at 530–32; Hyman, supra note 82, at 16. This positivist account, in which even 
unconstitutional statutes are “law” if they are enacted pursuant to the procedures in Article I, 
Section 7, poses no problem for judicial (or executive) review. Constitutional review is premised 
on choice-of-law concerns; the Constitution is hierarchically superior to statutory law if there is 
a conflict between the two. See Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against 
Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 8 (2007). That is entirely consistent with the 
hierarchically inferior source still being law in a meaningful sense. 
 142.  Cf. David A. Martland, Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of 
Executive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1675 (1985) (arguing 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires separation of executive and judicial powers). 
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law.143 To derive such a norm from the federal Constitution, however, 
is an extraordinary result that one would expect to have generated 
more interest than has yet emerged.144 Nonetheless, it appears to be 
the most plausible interpretation of the Davidson decision—and even 
a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process of Law Clause once one treats the Fourteenth Amendment 
clause as equivalent to the Fifth Amendment version. The Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause embodies the principle of 
legality, which includes, in the context of the Fifth Amendment, a 
substantive account of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. If the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process of Law Clauses really 
mean exactly the same thing, then it follows fairly readily that all state 
governments must conform to the basic separation-of-powers scheme 
imposed on the federal government by the Constitution’s three 
vesting clauses. On this account, states can deprive people of life, 
liberty, and property only through governmental institutions that 
conform in substance to the federal model of separated powers. 
If that seems to be an unlikely account of what “due process of 
law” means in the context of state governments under the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and it certainly seemed unlikely to the courts that 
developed due process doctrine in the nineteenth century), then what 
else might “due process of law” mean in that context? One perfectly 
 
 143.  Could the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause mean nothing more 
than that states must obey their own internal norms of separated powers, essentially making state 
constitutional violations matters of federal law? There is nothing in the nature of things to rule 
out such a notion. But due process of law duplicates compliance with the rest of the Constitution 
for federal actors because of the contents of the federal Constitution. The Constitution’s scheme 
for federal actors just happens to contain all of the norms plausibly embodied by due process of 
law. If that was not so, a due process of law clause would not be redundant. Maybe the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause absorbs this fact and just accepts anything 
that a state chooses to do in its own constitution, but that is not a reading that leaps forth from 
the page. 
 144.  Any such claims are non-starters as a matter of doctrine. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 
U.S. 71, 83–84 (1902) (“A local statute investing a collection of persons not of the judicial 
department, with powers that are judicial, and authorizing them to exercise the pardoning power 
which alone belongs to the governor of the state, presents no question under the Constitution 
of the United States. The right to the due process of law prescribed by the 14th Amendment 
would not be infringed by a local statute of that character. Whether the legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons 
or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert 
powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the 
determination of the state.”). 
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sensible option is to give up trying to relate the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment clauses and simply take the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process of Law Clause as an independent interpretative entity. 
There is much to be said for this approach. While there was little 
federal case law interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of 
Law Clause in 1868, there was, as we have already noted, a fair amount 
of state law interpreting related provisions in state constitutions. 
Perhaps the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of 
Law Clause lies in those state cases, which would presumably have no 
relevance to the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment clause that 
has its own history and context.145 If that is the right answer, and it 
might very well be the right answer, this Article has concluded. 
But suppose that one is, for reasons either of interpretation or 
doctrine, committed to the idea that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ Due Process of Law Clauses must be harmonized at 
least in principle measure, if not treated as lock-step identical in 
meaning. Then one has to come up with some way to give content to 
the Fourteenth Amendment provision in light of the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment provision. What kind of account of original 
meaning would make sense on those assumptions? 
In the context of the original Constitution, “due process of law” 
essentially refers to the principle of legality and thus requires executive 
and judicial actors to ground their deprivations of life, liberty, or 
property in law.146 The text of the Constitution then limits the manner 
by which those deprivations can take place by actors who are granted 
enumerated “executive” or “judicial” powers, respectively. It is not 
easy to apply this notion to state governments that are not formally 
constrained by the Constitution’s separation-of-powers norms. What 
if a state wants its courts or executive agencies to function essentially 
as legislatures? What if it wants the highest court in the state to be the 
most numerous branch of the state legislature? If due process of law 
 
 145.  I take this to be one of Professor Eberle’s key points. See Eberle, supra note 126. 
 146.  Because the focus here is on the development of procedural due process doctrine, I 
am setting aside the possibility that due process of law functions as a constraint on the substance 
of legislation. 
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does not forbid these structural arrangements (if it does, we ended the 
discussion three paragraphs ago), what might it do? 
A possible answer is to say that so long as the state legislature is 
the relevant actor, federal notions of due process of law mostly drop 
out of the picture (subject, perhaps, to a Murray’s Lessee qualification 
for laws that change traditional legal forms too much and perhaps to 
a “rational basis” or “arbitrariness” check on substance). When the 
relevant state actor is judicial, the traditional forms of judicial process, 
which were as well known in 1868 as they were in 1788 and 1791, 
must be followed. But what happens when the relevant state actor is 
executive? That is where the rise of the administrative state makes 
its entrance. 
State legislatures sometimes choose to act by vesting a measure of 
discretion in other actors, effectively letting those other actors make 
law. Rather than set railroad rates themselves, which they could do 
without violating the principle of legality (though any particular act 
might violate a host of constitutional provisions, both state and 
federal), state legislatures sometimes choose to create executive 
commissions that will find facts and set rates for them. Rather than 
prescribe and apportion taxes, which they could do without violating 
the principle of legality (though any particular tax might violate a host 
of constitutional provisions, both state and federal), they sometimes 
choose to create boards that find facts and fix and apportion the taxes 
for them. As state governments took on increasingly complex 
regulatory tasks in the nineteenth century, especially concerning such 
matters as railroad transport and irrigation, this strategy of 
delegation  of legislative authority to executive commissions acquired 
considerable appeal. 
A pure separation-of-powers understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause might forbid the delegation 
outright, on the ground that executive actors can perform only 
executive functions. But once that version of due process of law has 
been dismissed as implausible in the context of state governments 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the permissibility of the 
delegation is purely a matter of state law. Some states might choose to 
forbid their legislatures from passing off their powers, but others 
might permit it. 
If a state legislature delegates tax-setting or rate-setting authority 
to an agency or commission, it is effectively allowing the agency or 
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commission to deprive people of property. Presumably, the legislature 
could affect the particular deprivation in question directly without 
violating the Due Process of Law Clause. (On the other side of the 
coin: if a particular deprivation is for some reason substantively invalid, 
it is hard to see how it could become valid by virtue of legislative 
delegation.) If the legislature sets a general norm, the default 
assumption would be that the norm must be applied in the courts, 
through ordinary judicial processes that conform to the model of due 
process of law. In those circumstances, any deprivations occur only 
through and after due process of law in the strongest sense of that 
term. The interposition of an agency or commission, however, 
changes the field. The deprivation no longer occurs through court 
processes, nor does it happen through the direct action of the 
legislature. The executive actor, in this scenario, is making rather than 
enforcing law by hypothesis. Couldn’t one see the minimum content 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause as a 
constraint on this kind of executive action, given that the principle of 
legality is first and foremost concerned with executive action that 
makes its own law to enforce? 
That is precisely the move that was made, sometimes directly and 
sometimes indirectly, by many of the post-Civil War due process of law 
cases. The Court suggested this result in Spencer v. Merchant,147 which 
held that the legislature could fix and apportion the tax itself,148 but 
noted in dictum that “[w]hen the determination of the lands to be 
benefited is entrusted to commissioners, the owners may be entitled 
to notice and hearing upon the question whether their lands are 
benefited and how much.”149 The price charged by the Court in this 
analysis for delegation by state legislatures is the imposition of 
 
 147.  Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345 (1888). 
 148.  See id. at 356. Well, maybe not quite. Relying on the prior decision in Davidson, the 
Court added the qualification: “If the legislature provides for notice to and hearing of each 
proprietor, at some stage of the proceedings, upon the question what proportion of the tax shall 
be assessed upon his land, there is no taking of his property without due process of law.” Id. at 
355–56. The legislature did not have an entirely free hand. 
 149.  Id. at 356. 
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procedural requirements when legislative power is exercised by 
executive agents. 
This delegate-your-legislative-power-and-lose-your-procedural-
free-ride doctrine gained steam in 1890 in Chicago, Milwaukee and St. 
Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad and Warehouse 
Commission.150 The Minnesota legislature delegated to a railroad 
commission the power to determine whether railroad rates are unfair 
or unequal, to set fair and equal rates, and to force those rates on the 
railroads through mandamus actions. As construed by the Minnesota 
courts, determinations of (un)fair or (un)equal rates by the 
commission were not judicially reviewable.151 Explained the Court: 
This being the construction of the statute by which we are bound in 
considering the present case, we are of opinion that, so construed, it 
conflicts with the Constitution of the United States in the particulars 
complained of by the railroad company. It deprives the company of 
its right to a judicial investigation, by due process of law, under the 
forms and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive 
ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in 
controversy, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, the 
action of a railroad commission which, in view of the powers 
conceded to it by the state court, cannot be regarded as clothed with 
judicial functions, or possessing the machinery of a court of justice.  
. . . No hearing is provided for, no summons or notice to the 
company before the commission has found what it is to find and 
declared what it is to declare, no opportunity provided for the 
company to introduce witnesses before the commission, in fact, 
nothing which has the semblance of due process of law . . . . 
. . . The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for 
transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the 
element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as 
regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, 
requiring due process of law for its determination.152 
Here we have a full-blown theory of “procedural due process” 
recognizable in its broad outlines to modern eyes. When legislatures 
 
 150.  Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n, 
134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
 151.  See id. at 456. 
 152.  Id. at 456–58. 
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delegate their power to make law, the Court seems to say that they 
must delegate that power to courts or, at the very least, to executive 
agencies that employ judicial-like procedures. The principle of legality 
thus morphed into a junior-varsity non-delegation doctrine that does 
not actually forbid state legislative delegations but requires judicial, or 
judicial-like, proceedings to substitute for legislative judgment.153 
There is, of course, a big difference between judicial proceedings 
and judicial-like proceedings. The latter can take place within 
executive agencies, and while they may have many of the trappings of 
judicial proceedings, such as notice and hearing, they will not 
necessarily have all the bells and whistles, such as an impartial 
adjudicator and, most conspicuously, a jury.154 If the legislature 
delegates authority to an executive agency or commission (or perhaps 
corporation), does it satisfy late nineteenth-century notions of due 
process of law if the agency provides notice and a right to some kind 
of hearing, short of full-blown judicial determinations? 
The Court’s unsurprising answer was yes. As was explained in 
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,155 an important late 
nineteenth-century case that was understood to be a test case for the 
many irrigation districts springing up throughout the western states:  
The legislature not having itself described the district, has not 
decided that any particular land would or could possibly be benefited 
as described, and, therefore, it would be necessary to give a hearing 
at some time to those interested upon the question of fact whether 
or not the land of any owner which was intended to be included 
would be benefited by the irrigation proposed. If such a hearing were 
 
 153.  I am not the first person to focus on the importance of legislative delegation in these 
cases. See Matthew J. Steilen, Due Process as a Choice of Law: A Study in the History of a Judicial 
Doctrine, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1086 (2016); Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and 
Due Process: The Historical Connection, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 223. Professor Woolhandler 
emphasizes a distinction between cases involving rate-setting and tax assessments, finding that 
the latter were really the origins of what we now call procedural due process. See id. at 234–38. 
She may very well be right about that as an historical matter. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, however, any such distinction had effectively disappeared. 
 154.  See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). 
 155.  Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). 
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provided for by the act, the decision of the tribunal thereby created 
would be sufficient.156  
Here the assumption was that irrigation districts, which paid off their 
bonds by levying assessments against property within the districts, 
were valid only if the assessments on land bore some relationship to 
the benefits to that land. If facts regarding those assessments were 
going to be determined by executive agents rather than legislatures or 
courts, there had to be hearings of some kind at the agency level.157 It 
is incidental to this story that the assumption of a requirement of 
rough proportionality, which had teeth for a while,158 soon gave way 
to a more deferential view of the state’s assessment power.159 
The idea that some executive procedures of notice and hearing, 
even if they do not approach the full magnificence of a common-law 
judicial trial, are both necessary and sufficient to validate executive 
exercises of delegated legislative authority found perhaps its definitive 
statement in one of the most famous of the post-Civil War due process 
of law cases. In Londoner v. City and County of Denver,160 the Court 
faced the then-latest in a long line of cases challenging state tax 
assessment mechanisms under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process of Law Clause.161 Colorado gave its local governments unusual 
autonomy, though that did not seem to make a difference in the 
decision. The Denver City Council sent out tax bills to local property 
owners to pay for street paving. There were numerous irregularities in 
the process leading up to those tax bills; as Professor Steilen aptly 
remarks, “One catches a distinct whiff of corruption.”162 None of that, 
however, raised a federal constitutional claim. The landowners 
opposing the tax bills got their case into federal court by claiming, as 
 
 156.  Id. at 167. 
 157.  On the important connection between the integrity of fact-finding and judicial 
requirements of procedure, see Woolhandler, supra note 153, at 235–41. 
 158.  See Vill. of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278–79 (1898). 
 159.  See French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901) (limiting, by a 6–3 
vote, the holding in Norwood). 
 160.  Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
 161.  For an epic-length summary of the nineteenth-century cases, see Barber Asphalt 
Paving Co., 181 U.S. at 328–45. For a briefer overview of the highlights, see Steilen, supra note 
153, at 1079–85. 
 162.  Steilen, supra note 153, at 1087. 
2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  2:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
660 
was factually true, that they had never had the opportunity for an in-
person meeting with the City Council, presumably to see if the city 
council members were willing to lie to their faces (as they seemed quite 
willing to lie in written documents). “From beginning to end of the 
proceedings the landowners, although allowed to formulate and file 
complaints and objections, were not afforded an opportunity to be 
heard upon them.”163 They were allowed to file pieces of paper with 
the city council but nothing more, and the city council wildly 
misrepresented those filed papers in its written issuances.164 In now-
famous language, the Court both reiterated its delegation-based 
theory of due process of law and held that some kind of oral 
proceeding was necessary under the facts of this case: 
In the assessment, apportionment and collection of taxes upon 
property within their jurisdiction the Constitution of the United 
States imposes few restrictions upon the States . . . . But where the 
legislature of a state, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to some 
subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount, 
and upon whom it shall be levied, and of making its assessment and 
apportionment, due process of law requires that at some stage of the 
proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer 
shall have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice, 
either personal, by publication, or by a law fixing the time and place 
of the hearing. . . . 
If it is enough that, under such circumstances, an opportunity is 
given to submit in writing all objections to and complaints of the tax 
to the board, then there was a hearing afforded in the case at bar. 
But we think that something more than that, even in proceedings 
for taxation, is required by due process of law. Many requirements 
essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in 
proceedings of this nature. But even here a hearing in its very essence 
demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support 
 
 163.  Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385. 
 164.  The city council averred, in approving the tax assessments, that “no complaint or 
objection has been filed or made against the apportionment of said assessment . . . but the 
complaints and objections filed deny wholly the right of the city to assess . . . .” Id. at 384–85. 
This was transparently false. See id. at 382. 
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his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, 
however informal.165 
Here we have the familiar foundations of modern due process law. The 
key element is now the kinds of procedures that executive agents 
employ, not whether the executive agent complies with the principle 
of legality. The move from substance to procedure is complete. 
To carry the story to the present day, one would have to stop at 
many stations. There is the station, seven years later, at which Justice 
Holmes, who had dissented in Londoner, wrote for a majority in Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization166 that 
generalized, rather than site- or block-specific, taxation does not 
require any kind of notice or hearing—an idea that has translated into 
the doctrine that agency rulemakings of sufficient generality are not 
subject to due process analysis.167 One would have to trace how the 
delegation element in this analysis dropped out of sight, leaving the 
post-Civil War due process framework applicable to all state and local 
executive deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.”168 One would 
need to track through the process by which the content of “life, 
liberty, or property” came to include government benefits, again vastly 
expanding the universe of actions subject to due process scrutiny. One 
would need to explore how the procedural requirements of this 
expanded universe morphed from a vague but emphatic requirement 
that agencies provide whatever procedures are fair under all of the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case into a three-factored 
utilitarian calculus.169 Most pertinently to this project, one would need 
to see how this framework that developed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment became applicable, through a kind of reverse-
incorporation, to federal agency action under the Fifth Amendment. 
After all, if the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of 
Law Clauses must mean the same thing, then doctrine developed to 
deal with the peculiarities of state executive action will also become 
applicable to federal administrative action. This, of course, entails a 
 
 165.  Id. at 385–86. 
 166.  Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 167.  See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347–48 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 168.  For a good start to the telling of this part of the story, see Woolhandler, supra note 
153, at 258–60. 
 169.  Two co-authors and I have traced that particular development in prior work. See 
Lawson et al., supra note 9. 
2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  2:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
662 
gross misinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause, shearing it entirely free of its roots in the principle of legality 
and the original Constitution’s provisions and structure. 
It is beyond this project to say whether it would be a good or bad 
thing to have a due process doctrine in which the Fifth Amendment 
provision means simply the principle of legality (and is entirely 
redundant for that reason) while the Fourteenth Amendment 
provision has a very different application—whether that different 
application be modern law, the delegation-based doctrine of the late 
nineteenth century, a hard requirement of state compliance with 
separation of powers, or something completely different grounded in 
antebellum state case law, it is unnecessary to say here. My goal has 
been only to explore the original meaning—or, rather, non-
meaning—of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause and 
to suggest how the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
generated problems whose answers, as a matter of original meaning, 
are very far from obvious, but whose effect on the Fifth Amendment 
have been profound. Even if modern doctrine will not de-couple the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that de-coupling is essential to 
recovery of the former’s original meaning. 
 
